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Trans portation systems in many nations of the world may not be
adequate to support large scale combat operations against insurgent forces.
The loss of capacity in a system due to insurgent action is related to cer-
tain parameters that characterize a transportation arc. These (possibly)
reduced capacities become input parameters for the minimum cost flow
solution of the transportation problem. Suggestions are made for deter-
mining the relationships between the parameters and the loss of capacity
of the system due to insurgency. Possible areas for future study and other
methods of approach are also discussedo
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The coming decade will see revolutionary war occurring in various
parts of the World. The" newly-emerging nations" or the underdeveloped
countries are those most susceptible to this type of internal stress,, ^
Examination of the histories of such revolutions as those in Algeria
[7], Cuba [ll], and Greece [4] shows that during the intitial phases of the
war in a country, insurgents who were indigenous to that region took up
arms against the legal government. They conducted a campaing of terror,
oppression, sabotage, arson, and muder in order to advance their cause.
Mao Tse-Tung has stated that the revolutionist must be "... against
the mere routing of the enemy, and for a war of annihilation. "° Annihilation
of the enemy is a means by which the insurgents reach their ultimate objec-
tive, becoming the de jure as well as the de facto government. This may
be done by killing the governments jrepresentatives and their supporters,
forcing them into exile, or, preferably, converting them to the revolutionary
cause.
Che Guevara has commented on the ultimate objective of a revolu-
tionary movement. In his book on the Cuban revolution, he states:
Griffith, S.B. , O. E. Chubb, and P. Durdin, "Red China, " Marine
Corps Gazette. 49:10-33, October, 1965.
2
Rostow, W.W. , "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas, " Marine
Corps Gazette , 32:1-46, January, 1962.
3Mao T-se-Tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers,
1954), I, pp. 116-118.
Final liberation comes only with the total
systematic break-up of the enemy army and all
institutions that supported the old regime. 4
The legally constituted government, in its attempt to supress an
insurrection, often finds it necessary to deploy its military forces through-
out the country. Other nations may be requested to provide assistance in
supporting the deployed government forces, and to help maintain order.
The United States provided such assistance to Greece in 1946, to the
Philippines in 1948, to Lebanon in 1958, and now provides assistance to
Thailand and Viet Nam. Britain provided assistance to Malaya during a ten
year counterinsurgency campaign in the 1950's.
To destroy government forces, the insurgents may attempt to gain
tactical superiority, either by surprise or by concentrating forces. Attack-
ing lines of communication isolates government units, making them more
vulnerable to insurgent attacks "
Efficient operations of the existing modes of transportation for the
logistical support of deployed forces, together with the introduction of new
equipment, is an important factor in determining the government! s ability
to conduct a successful counterinsurgency operation. ' Before conducting
Che Guevara on Guerrilla "Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961),
Po 61o
5Mao Tse lung, p_p_ cit. , pp. 116-128; Valeriano, N.D. andC.T.R.
Bohannan, Counterquerrilla Operations (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1964).
Bayo, Alberto, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla (Denver: Cypress Printing
Company, 1963), p„ 30.
Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1964), pp. 107-123.
such operations, the government may need to know the capacities of the
various available modes of transportation, and their vulnerability to attack,,
The weak points in the system should be recognized, and measures to cor-
rect the deficiencies should be determined.
Supplies that are shipped within a transportation system may be
considered to fall into one of three categories:
(1) Assault - materials transported with troops for an attack or
evacuation;
(2) Emergency - unscheduled resupply, usually consisting of food,
medicine, or ammunition;
(3) Regular - scheduled resupply of those items consumed during
ordinary operations =
Assault and emergency supply often use transportation units organic
to the assault units or to their supporting units. Regular scheduled resupply
possibly could use a major portion of those transportation facilities avail-
able to the public, such as highways, railroads, and canals. In some cases,
additional military units may be added to augment the public facilities. It
may be considered that the largest bulk of the materials required for regular
resupply of units in the field could be shipped by public transportation facili-
tieSo F(Jr this reason, only category (3), regular resupply, is considered
in this investigation
.
In many nations that face the threat of insurgency, an adequate
public transportation system for civilian use does not exist. The additional
burden of supporting military units, providing for their regular resupply,
would be impossible to carry in most cases „ Both military and civilians
should have access to a transportation system that provides for adequate
two-way movement of necessary materials.
Development of a mathematical model may facilitate the design of
a transportation system. The use of this model would permit the examina-
tion of effects caused by insurgency and natural interference, the relative
value of different transportation means, analysis of trade-offs, and varia-
tions in cost effectiveness „ Various mixes of transportation modes could
be simulated to examine their effect on flow in the system. The designed
system may be compared with existing systems for the purpose of deter-
mining procurement and construction needs.
The Problem
The purpose of this investigation is to develop and define a model
that can be used to analyse transportation systems in various geographic
locations where the system is subject to disturbances caused by insurgent
actions, terrain, weather, vehicle availability and civilian traffic. Since
little is known about the effects of insurgent actions upon a transportation
system, the proposal of a method by which to estimate such effects becomes
part of the problem. Figure 1 is a block diagram that shows the interactions
of the disturbance factors with the operating system. These interactions
are discussed in section 2.
The model is developed in section 2. The development begins with
a discussion of the parameters of the transportation problem and some pre-
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liminary definitions. Then, following a list of the system's assumed
characteristics, the proposal of a method for estimating the effects of in-
surgent actions is presented along with an outline of data required. Final-
ly, the selection of a representative model for the analysis of transportation
systems is discussed.
Section 3 contains the discussion of the use of the model. Results,
conclusions and recommendations for futher investigation are presented in
section 4. A selected bibliography concludes the paper.
2. Design of the model.
Discussion of the Variables
Optimality, as viewed in this study, implies minimizing the cost
of achieving objectives. A transportation system may be defined as the
aggregate of all facilities available to an organization, or to a group of
people, for the movement of material and personnel from one place to an-
other. For the purpose of this study, the objective of a transportation system
is to move material and/or personnel at the rates demanded. It follows that
the optimum transportation system will be usch that this movement may be
accomplished at minimum cost.
The demands for movement, called requirements in this study, are
stated as amounts required per unit time. Requirements are not necessarily
constant. They may change during any period of time.
Requirements are assumed to be generated by consumption of food,
ammunition, fuel, and equipment in the field. The amounts required per
unit time depend in part on the number of troops to be supplied and on the
10
the type of operations they perform.
Time enters the problem through the statement of requirements . But,
if time is discretized by choosing a standard unit such as a week, all re-
quirements can be stated in terms of such a standard unit. Once the unit
is chosen, time is contained implicitly in a statement of requirements.
The following definitions may be applied to a transportation system:
(1) Flow - the amount of material and/or personnel moved between
any two points in a transportation system during a given period
of time;
(2) Node - an origin or a destination of flow;
(3) Arc - the route of flow between two nodes;
(4) Mode - type of arc, road, rail, or air. Each mode constitutes
a distinct arc between any two nodes;
(5) Capacity - an upper limit on flow through a given arc.
The movement (flow) of goods through the system is limited by various
characteristics of the system. The capacity of an arc under ideal conditions
is determined by characteristics which can be measured directly or estimated
with reasonable accuracy* Other factors, not characteristic to the arcs,
tend to reduce this ideal capacity. For example, insurgent troops may block
a road or blow up a bridge. These "other" factors are the ones considered
in this study. They are discussed in the next section.
Generally, the costs of operating a transportation system may be
determined on the basis of requirements, system and resource characteristics,
allocation and scheduling,, A cost per unit flow may be assigned to each arc.
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Optimal allocation and scheduling are prerequisites of the minimum cost
solution to a transportation problem.
The system is assumed to have the following characteristics:
(1) Requirements, stated in tons per unit time, are predetermined
inputs to the problem. Requirements at terminals or some
portion of them may be considered to be lower bounds on flow;
(2) Flow may be considered to be distributed uniformly over time.
For example, if it takes a convoy of trucks five days to travel
an arc while transporting thirty-five tons of material, the flow
may be assumed to be five tons per day. This may imply the
existence of a stock level at the receiving terminal, but such
an implication seems reasonable and does not effect the solution.
(3) Ideal (initial) capacities may be estimated with reasonable
accuracy. They are based on the restrictions,imposed by vehicle
and cargo characteristics, terrain, traffic, and allocation and
scheduling decisions.
(4) The most significant factors that reduce these capacities are
weather and insurgent operations.
(5) Weather significantly affects only air transportation in the short
run. In this case, weather may be predicted so as
;
to allow
adjustment of the system. Long run weather effects on surface
transport may be included in the initial capacities for any par-
I
ticular period of time.
(6) The costs of constructing the existing transportation system are
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sunk costs. Operating costs assigned to an arc include the
cost of defending the arc.
(7) Costs vary linearly with flow in the range considered. That is,
the cost per unit flow on any arc is constant during the time
period covered by a solution,. Even if costs do not vary linearly,
a straight line approximation over a small range of flow seems
feasible.
(8) The sum of flows out of any node is equal to the sum of flows
into it. There are no gains or losses. The effects of loss of
supplies to attacking insurgent forces may be examined para-
metrically by increasing costs and reducing capacities on par-
ticular arcs.
Determination of Constraints on Flow
Insurgents may attempt to occupy and control a base area that is
relatively free from attack by government forces. * In his writings, Mao
mentions the importance of base areas to provide rest, training, and medical
facilities and to manufacture basic necessities for an expanding guerrilla
2
army.
The base area of the insurgent forces may be within the country they
are attempting to control „ The revolutionists in Cuba and the Philippines
had such bases. The base area could lie outside the boundaries, in a nation







whose government is sympathetic with the insurgents' cause. I Yugoslavia
provided such a base area for the Greek insurgents, ^ and the F. L. No re-
quired Tunisian territory to support their operations
„
Operating in a contested area, the insurgents usually attempt to
extend their control to the government base area Q In some cases, the whole
country may be contested. Areas of the region may be secure in varying
degrees against the encroachment of control by one side or the other.
The Republic of Viet Nam is an example of an entire country that is
contested. The insurgents' former base areas, such as the "Iron Traingle"
or the central highlands, are now contested due to the striking ability of the
air mobile units and the air attacks by B-52 bombers. Similarly, no area
under nominal government control is free from the danger of a terrorist bomb
or a mortar attack. Therefore, the transportation arcs required by govern-
ment forces to move necessary supplies are subject to attack by the insurgents
in the contested areas.
The reasons for attacking transportation arcs are not stated explicity |
in the writings of many of the theoreticians and practitioners of guerrilla
warfare. However, a few of the implied reasons may be deduced [l], [2],
[9]. Some of these reasons are to:
(l) Prevent the movement of government troops;
3 Murray, J. C„, "The Anti- Bandit War, " Marine Corps Gazette , 38:1-15,
January, 1954.
4 Paret, P. and J W„ Shy, "Guerrilla War and U. S. Military Policy, "
Marine Corps Gazette , 46:1-29, January, 1962.
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(2) Capture needed supplies;
(3) Kill government troops as part of an attrition campaign;
(4) Harass government forces, causing them to spread their defenses;
(5) Cause labor and materials to be directed from the counterinsur-
gency effort to maintaining the transportation system;
(6} Hinder the movement of civilian goods and products in an attempt
to disrupt the nation's economy;
(7) Demonstrate active opposition to the government, and to encou-
rage others to join the insurgent forces;
(8) Discredit the government, showing that it has no power to
protect its citizens.
A survey of the literature indicated that there are parameters that
may affect the capacity of an arc.
These parameters are related to inherent characteristics of the arc,
the requirements for use of the arc, and allocation of resources by friendly
and enemy forces. These parameters include:
(1) Importance of the arc to the government;
(2) Vulnerability of the arc to damage by the insurgents;
(3) Accessibility of the arc to the insurgents;
(4) Defensive forces assigned to that arc.
Measurement of these characteristics could lead to determining the
effect they have on the loss of capacity due to insurgent attack. Data on
these four factors, collected and analyzed with respect to loss of capacity,
may make it possible to determine definite relationships. This may permit
15
prediction of the loss of capacity in a transportation system, or estimation
of defensive forces required to keep losses at a given level „ Therefore,
Importance, Vulnerability, and Accessibility are defined and some relation-
ships are proposed.
it is proposed that a measure of the importance I of an arc ij be
proportional to the quantity of goods that are required to be shipped through
the arc„ Consider node j with two arcs ij and kj into j» Suppose that j has
requirements Q, and this must be shipped through arcs ij and kj. The arcs
have capacities Mjj and M^j, with shipping costs Cjj and C^j. If C^j <
C^j and Mj^j + My > Q, the one would assign arc kj to carry as much as it
can, i.e a Mj^j. The rest qf the material required at j must be shipped
through arc ij. Then the required flow through arc ij is Qy = Q - Mj^j,
and the importance of arc ij could be written as ly = k, + k« Qu, where
ki and k« are non-negative constants.
The vulnerability of an arc is a measure of its susceptibility to dam-
age by the means available to the insurgents. To assign a value to vulner-
ability, several factors are considered. Resources available to the insur-
gents may dictate a particular type of target, or limit the damage done in
an attack. The number of bridges, tunnels, curves, locks, or other easily
damaged sections of the arc seem to give an indication of its vulnerability.
The government's ability to repair the arc once it is damaged is also con-
sideredo A possible measure for vulnerability is proposed to be V^ = m^ +
m2 Bjj, where m, and m? are non-negative constants, and Bjj is the maximum
number of man-hours required to repair p percent damage to the n complex
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sections of the arc if they were damaged simultaneously.
As an example of vulnerability, consider the arc ij with two bridges,
a tunnel, and three hairpin curves. Assume that the insurgents have the
capability of attacking any three of the vulnerable sections simultaneously,
and inflicting 50% damage. In this case, n = 3, and p = . 50. If it takes
250 man-hours to repair any curve if it is 50% damaged, 1200 man-hours to
repair the tunnel, and 750 man-hours to repair either bridge, then
Bij = max of any 3 (250,250,250,1200,750,750)
Bij = 250 + 1200 + 750 = 2200 man-hours
The measure V^j = m^ + m£ B^, implies that an arc increases in vul-
nerability with an increasing number of sensitive sections , If the repair
crews can work on several damaged sections simultaneously, then B. ^ would
be less than if they had to be repaired in order. If n becomes large, then
the increase of B^ may be non-linear. However, it is assumed that in the
range of interest, the linear relation will be an adequate approximation.
It is reasonable to expect that the vulnerability of an air arc, and
its accessibility to insurgents might approach zero. An exception might be
the situation where the insurgents are able, by using small arms fire, to
force aircraft to fly around an area. Since aircraft must operate from airfields,
it may be desirable to measure the accessibility of the nodes instead.
An arc must be accessible to the insurgents before they can carry
out an attack. This includes the amount of cover available near the arc
as well as the nunb er of men that the insurgents have available for the attack.
A proposed measure of accessibility is A^ = n^ + n
2




non-negative constants, and E^j is the estimated number of enemy troops
within some distance of the arc ij. This relationship indicates that the
accessibility of an arc increases when insurgents in the area increase. Al-
though this may not be an exact linear relationship, it is assumed that in
the range of interest the linear relationship is a close approximation.
Another important factor in determining the loss on an arc is the
number, type, and quality of forces assigned to protect the arc. The defen-
sive forces may be used in static positions, and their surveillance range may
be increased by the use of acoustic, visual, or other types of detectors.
Personnel may be used as a mobile defense, actively patrolling the area
near the arc» Some combination of these two may be used.
The importance, vulnerability, accessibility, and level of insurgent
activity may be assumed to determine the defensive forces assigned to pro-
tect an arc. The defense D is then;
Djj = f(Iy, Vy, Ajj, Sy)„ where S is a measure of the level of
insurgent activity on arc ij.
The measure for Dy should take into account that some defenses
are more effective than others. Certain mixes of men and equipment may
prove to be more effective than others in preventing insurgent attacks.
The capacity of arc ij, My, is the limit set by the physical character-
istics and vehicle allocation on the arc as previously defined. Insurgent
activity may establish a new capacity, Xy, such that Xy £My. The loss
in capacity is defined to be Ly = My - Xy. Since the maximum loss cannot
be greater than the capacity of the arc, max Ly = My.
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The loss in capacity, L.
., is assumed to vary inversely with the
defensive forces. The relationship L«<~ also depends indirectly upon I, V,
A, and i, Since D =f(I, V, A, S), then L = g (I, V, A, S, D).
Data to determine if any dependence actually does exist and to futher
develop these relationships, should be collected on a particular arc ij, and
be base upon some time interval, such as a week.
The measures for I, V, and A are used for illustration only, Other,
and possibly better, measures for those characteristics may be found in the
analysis of the data.
The characteristics that are of interest are listed below. Included
is suggested data that could be collected to determine a measure of that
characteristic.
(1) Importance
(a) Number of tons of material moved over an arc.
(b) Maximum number of tons of material that could be moved
under ideal conditions, Mjj.
(c) Dollar cost per ton to ship goods over an arc.
(d) Number of troops assigned to defend an arc.
(e) Dollar cost to defend an arc.
(2) Vulnerability
(a) Number of each type of critical sections.
(b) Time required to repair each type of critical section.
(c) Location of repair units.
(d) Location of static defenses.
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(e) Number of patrols, area patrolled, and frequency of patrols.
(f) Capability of repair units.
(g) Estimated resources of the insurgents, including men and
material.
(3) Accessibility
(a) Type of terrain near the arc.
(b) Location of insurgent base area.
(c) Number of insurgents within two days march of the arc
Incident reports following an actual insurgent attack on an arc may
provide more information on the proposed relationships. Data taken from
the incident reports may include:
(1) Time, date and location of the attack.
(2) Weather conditions before and during the attack.
(3) Damage done, and estimated time to repair.
(4) Location of defensive forces at the time.
(5) Estimate of number of insurgents taking part*
(6) Estimate of where insurgents came from and where they went
upon completing the attack.
Upon com pletion of repairs to the damage done by the attack, futher
information should be obtained to complement data taken from the incident
report. These data would include:
(1) Actual number of man-hours required to repair damage.
(2) Number of hours damaged section closed to traffic.
(3) Number of hours arc was capable of handling reduced traffic.
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(4) Amount of material shipped and arc used to send supplies to the
terminal of the damaged arc while repairs are being made.
The data collected on an arc while in a "steady state" condition,
and immediately following an incident, together with an assessment of the
repaired damage may result in the verification of the proposed relationships.
Selection of the Representative Model
Once the (possibly) reduced capacities have been determined, the
problem is to find the minimum cost flow solution of the transportation prob-
lem. The input parameters are requirements, capacities, and costs. Since
none of these are really determined with infinite precision, the solution may
be Dnly a close approximation to the optimal solution. It may be possible
to determine the input parameters with great accuracy, but the cost of doing
it would probably be prohibitive. If the cost-flow relationship is found to
be curvilinear, as solution for a large system would be complicated consid-
erably. In the interest of efficiency in the use of time and resources the
simplifying assumption of linearity in the cost-flow relationship is made.
This provides a linear function for minimization, which implies constant
returns to scale in the economic sense. Constant returns to scale means
output is directly proportional to input. And since capacities and require-
ments are respectively one-dimensional upper and lower bounds on flow,
the constraints on the flow variables are stated in terms of linear inequali-
ties. The linear relationships permit the formulation of this problem as a
linear program.
The part of linear programming theory called network flows seems
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particularly applicable to transportation problems. The network flow model
using the "out-of -kilter" method of solution was chosen for several reasons.
First, Fulkersoh\ s out-of-kilter algorithm 5 for the solution of network
flow problems allows the use of lower bounds (requirements), as well as
upper bounds (capacities), on flow. Second, the out-of-kilter method em-
ploys an iterative procedure that is amenable to programming for computer
solutions o The use of computers permits extensive parametric studies and
sensitivity analysis. The parametric studies and sensitivity analysis may
be accomplished with a computer simulation which allows repeated solutions
while varying the input parameters. Once an optimal solution has been found
with one set of input parameters, it may be used as the starting point for
the next computer run with changed parameters. This saves computer opera-
tion time. Third, the method leads to a minimum cost flow solution without
a non-negativity restriction on the cost coefficients „ Fourth, for observers
who may not be familiar with the theroy, graphical representation tends to
make the complex interactions within a system more understandable. Final-
ly, in a finite number of steps, the algorithm yields either the minimum cost
solution or the conclusion that no feasible flow exists for the current state
of the system.
Infeasible flows may be recognized as the existence of requirements
at a terminal that are greater than any possible flow into that terminal. Such
occurrences suggest adjustment of the system through changes in allocation,
scheduling or even in the inherent characteristics of the system. As will be
seen in the next section, the out-of-kilter algorithm determines the locations
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and amounts of deficiencies in the system in terms of flows.
3o Use of the Model.
This section describes the process of representing the transportation
system as a network flow problem and solving the problem by means of the
out-of-kilter algorithm.
The network may be formulated according to the following procedure.
Represent the system as a network with distinct arcs and nodes for each
mode. Add fictitious source and sink nodes. Arcs from the source to the
actual origin of system flow are assumed to have infinite capacities, zero
costs, and zero lower bounds. Arcs from the nodes at which requirements
exist to the sink are assumed to have infinite capacities, zero costs, and
lower bounds equal to the requirements at those nodes „ Add an arc from
sink to source to make the flow into the system equal to the flow out of the
system, and satisfy the material balance requirements. This circulation arc
has requirements, capacities and flow all equal to the total flow through
the network which for a feasible solution, must be equal to total requirements,
The following is the formulation of the linear program.
The Primal Problem;
Minimize ^ cH x..
ij
J
















Cji is the cost per unit flow on arc ij„
x.. is the amount of flow on arc ij.
I is the node-arc incidence matrix formed as follows.
Label each node numerically. List the nodes vertically and the 'arcs, such
that arc ij begins at node i and ends at node j, horizontally „ For each node-
arc combination, place in the matrix a (+ 1) for flow out of the node, and a
(- 1) for flow into the node, and a zero if the arc neither begins nor ends
at the particular node.
Iji is the lower bound on flow through arc ij . It is equal to require-
ments at node i on those arcs i,n joining the nodes at which
requirements exist to the sink, n, 1. . is equal to zero on all
other arcs,
m. . is the upper bound on flow through arc ij. These upper bounds are
the "reduced" capacities for each solution run
The algorithm is an efficient combination of the Primal-Dual and
Simplex methods for solving linear programs. It maximizes the Dual while
minimizing the Primal such that when the Primal and Dual are equal, the
solutionis optimal.
The procedure is based on the assumption that both the primal and
dual solutions exist, and on the following theorem due to Dantzig[3j.
"For optimal feasible solution of the primal and dual
systems, whenever slack occurs in the k" 1 relation of
either system, the kP^ variable of its dual vanishes;
if the k"1 variable is positive in either system, the
kP1 relation of its dual is equality. "
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This theorem is the basis for the complementary slackness conditions,
which are defined by the relations of states (a), (b), and (c) presented in the
next paragraph. When the complementary slackness-conditions are satisifed
for every arc in the system, the solution is optimal.
An arc may be in any one of nine possible states. These are:
(a) Vi-V^Cy, xu-ly
(b) V'Vj-Cy, lySXyim-y in Kilter
(C) Vj-V^Cy, Xy-my
<b l> Vi- Vj = C ij' "ij^ij







) V.-Vr c.y *..>!..
(c
2
) Vi- V. >cij# x^m^
where the V^ are the dual variables of the DC = relations „ They are assigned
to the nodes and, once an optimal feasible solution is reached, each V±
represents the minimum cost of moving the next unit of flow from node i to
the sink. The V^ - Vj represent this cost for arc ij. The other variables are
as defined in the linear program.
An arc in state (a), (b), or (c) satisfies the complementary slackness
conditions and therefore is in kilter . An arc in any of the other states does
not satisfy the conditions and is out of kilter . This algorithm seeks to bring
all arcs into kilter; that is, onto their complementary slackness diagrams.
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The diagrams are generated by the complementary slackness conditions
applicable to each arc. Figure 2 is a general example of a complementary
slackness diagram showing all the possible states of an arc The diagram
shows the relationships between flow, the dual costs, assigned costs, and
the upper and lower limits on flow for each arc.
Kilter numbers are defined such that zero implies that an arc is in
kilter. States (a), (b), and (c) have kilter numbers of zero. For the other
possible states, the kilter numbers are defined as follows:
(a^orO^): ly - Xy
(b2 ) or (c 2
) : XlJ - my
(Cl): CV.-V.-C^lm.j-Xy)
- fe 2 > : (Vi-V. -CyJCl.. -x..)
These numbers are all positive. Kilter numbers for (a,), (b]_), and (c
2 )
measure infeasibility while those for (a«) and (c,) measure the degree to
which these states violate the complementary slackness conditions.
The remaining part of this section is a step by step outline of the
out-of-kilter algorithm [5].
(1) Start with any circulation flow and assign any set of non-negative
V^ to the nodes. Try to find an out-of-kilter arc - one not in any
of the states (a), (b), and (c). If no out-of-kilter arcs can be
found, the problem has been solved and the solution is optimal.
Otherwise, go to step (2).
(2) Determine which out-of-kilter case applies. If (a,) applies,






















AN EXAMPLE OF A COMPLEMENTARY SLACKNESS
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSSIBLE STATES OF AN ARC
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by labelling node j with (i/ljj - Xjj/+).
(i) If node r is labeled (k/F
r
/*) and mode s is unlabelled, then







, ^ <i rs
l2) Vr " Vs a C rs< *rs > mrs
then label node s with (r/F s/+) where F s = min (F r , l rs - xrs )
for case (1) and F_ = min (F r/ m„ - x„) for case (2)a * I a rs
(ill If node r is labelled (k/F r/ _) and node s is unlabelled, then
if sr is an arc such that











then label node s with (r/F s/-) where F s = min (Fr , x - l gr)
for case (1) and F s = min (Fr , xgr - msr) for case (2).
If node i of the out-of-kilter arc can be labelled, send
through the appropriate flow and adjust the flows in all other arcs
of the loop. Of node i cannot be labelled, then a cut set (S, S)
results where S is the set of labelled nodes and S is the set of
unlabelled nodes.
Define
= mm min jcrs - (Vr - Vs)j ;






rs 6 (S, S)
hyperactive
and xrs > l rs
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and then set V = V for all r 6 S
r r
—
V = V for all r € S
r r
—
Note that determination includes arc ij. If arc ij is in
kilter after the V
r
's are changed, look for other out-of-kilter
arcs and repeat the process of step (2). If arc ij is still out-
of-kilter, continue to try to lable node i. If it is impossible
to label node i, then stop; there is no feasible circulation flow
and adjustments must be made to the system.
If (b^) or (cj_) applies, begin with a label of (i/m- - x-u/+) on node
j and then proceed as for state (a,). Here we try to increase flow
in arc ij to m^. If (a 2) or O^) applies, then the labelling process
starts at node i, instead of node j, and the label on node i is
(j/scjj - 1-h/-). The rest of the procedure is the same as for (a^).
Here we try to reduce the flow in arc ij to l^o
If (C2) applies, then proceed as for ^l and (b«) except that node
i is labelled (j/x^ - m-y/-). Here we try to reduce the flow in
arc ij to m^.
This algorithm solves the problem in a finite number of steps or ter-
minates with the conclusion that no feasible flow exists „ But, when an in-
feasibility exists, the kilter number defines its amount and location. This
allows adjustments toward feasibility without disturbing the rest of the
system. The status of any arc is not made worse at any time during the com-
putation. All arcs that are in kilter remain in kilter. Kilter numbers for arcs
that are out-of-kilter either decrease or remain unchanged at each step. In
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the special case in which the initial flow is feasible, at least one kilter
number decreases at each step,
4, Conclusions and Recommendations.
This paper attempts to describe the relations between losses in a
transportation system and outside forces. A proposal is made to construct
a deterministic mathematical model. This model, based on the parameters
importance, vulnerability, accessibility, level of insurgent activity, and
defensive forces seems feasible.
This model may be used to examine the effects of insurgency, the
relative value of different transportation means, analysis of trade-offs, and
variations in cost effectiveness. Various mixes of transportation modes
could be simulated to examine their effect on flow in the system.
Several questions must be answered before relationships can be de-
fined, Measurements for I, V, and A are proposed. Importance I is a linear
function of the quantity of material required to be shipped on an arc. Vulner-
ability V is a linear function of the number of sensitive sections of the arc,
and accessibility A is a linear function of the number of enemy troops near
the arc.
An outline of the data required for the determination of the actual
relationships is presented. Analysis of these data may determine whether
the measures proposed for I, V, and A are acceptable. The proportionalty
constants could possibly be determined from the data, also.
The use of the ouitrPf-kilter algorithm for the network flow problem
seems to be applicable for the transportation system. The conditions that
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must be met, the implied assumptions, and the use of the algorithm is dis-
cussed for this particular situation,,
No measurements for S and D are offered. Although it is indicated
that S may be some measure of the level of insurgent activity, and D may
be a measure of the effects of the defensive forces, further study is needed
to find suitable units of measurement.
Further analysis may indicate that one or more of the five parameters
selected as having an important bearing on the determination of losses may,
in fact, not effect losses at all. Other parameters may become apparent,
and recognition of them would be an important result from the analysis of
data.
Other methods of approach may be more profitable in further studies
on this subject. Instead of a deterministic value of loss on each arc,
perhaps a probability distribution function could be found that would indicate
the probability that losses on an arc would exceed a given amount. Modifi-
cation of the out-of-kilter algorithm may be necessary before it is used
with probabilistic losses.
An approach using queueing theory may be used to describe events on
an arc. Consider repair of damage to the arc as a "service" and the damage
from insurgent attacks as "arrivals". Data may be used to derive a probabi-
lity disturbution for arrivals. The probability of an attack, or the conditional
probability of losses given an attack may be of use in planning the deploy-
ment of defensive forces or for routing of shipments.
3D
This paper assumes that the properties of the network are invariant
in some short period of time,, In fact, they may not be. Insurgent attacks
may cause increasing (or decreasing) losses as the revolutionary war pro-
gresses. Another approach using time as a parameter may prove valuable.
In summary, we have shown that construction of a mathematical
model to describe losses in a transportation system is feasible. This
model would be of value to those men responsible for the safe movement
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